Experiences of art involve exercise of ordinary cognitive and perceptual capacities but in unique ways. These two features of experiences of art imply the mutual importance of aesthetics and cognitive science. Cognitive science provides empirical and theoretical analysis of the relevant cognitive capacities. Aesthetics thus does well to incorporate cognitive scientific research. And aesthetics offers philosophical analysis of the uniqueness of the experience of art. Thus cognitive science does well to incorporate the explanations of aesthetics. This paper explores this general framework of expansionism: a research strategy that suggests that the explanatory goals and resources of both aesthetics and cognitive science should expand to include those of the other. Two relations are considered. First, what is the relation between aesthetics and more traditional cognitive science? And, second, what is the relation between aesthetics and new developments in cognitive science which de-emphasize mental representation and emphasize body and action?
perception. What cognitive science says about cognition is important for philosophical aesthetics. The explanatory implications might also run the other way. One might infer from the fact that there is an independent field of research, aesthetics and philosophy of art, that there is something special about the kinds of experiences-including cognitive ones-we have with artworks and aesthetic objects. Cognitive science has an obligation to accommodate these experiences (at least the cognitive ones) and does well to fulfil that obligation by attending to the philosophical work already done in this area. 1 1 Some philosophers distinguish 'aesthetics' from 'philosophy of art', where the first might refer to issues of beauty, value, and certain types of experiences of artworks and other objects. 'Philosophy of art', by contrast, is sometimes used to refer to general philosophical issues (often metaphysical and epistemological) concerning artworks and Some philosophers have explored these directions of influence (Rollins 1999a; Carroll 2004; Levinson 2004; Lopes 1999) . Importantly, some have been suspicious that any deep connection between aesthetics and cognitive science exists. Gregory Currie, while admitting that research in cognitive science is broadly important to art and aesthetics, suggests that such research has not and may never engage with more finegrained issues regarding our experiences in making and consuming art. So while studies in cognitive neuroscience and psychology, for example, may help to clarify the perceptual and cognitive capacities involved in seeing a picture or imagining a fictional world, "they are relatively undiscriminating; they do little to illuminate our aesthetic judgements about particular works, traditions, styles, or genres" (Currie 2003: 708) . It seems that the forecast here is that in explaining experiences with art, cognitive science will not displace philosophical aesthetics.
Few discussions of the intersection of aesthetics and cognitive science clarify the notion of cognitive science at work. A commonly assumed understanding amongst philosophers and cognitive scientists alike is that cognitive science is simply the science of cognition. This assumption is at least partly justified by today's convention: there seems to be little constraint on the research activities of many cognitive science centres and academic departments short of their studying and theorizing cognition in broadly scientific ways. According to this notion of cognitive science-Robert Harnish calls this the broad construal (Harnish 2002 : 2)-it is a discipline centred around investigating the domain of cognition, and by a variety of methodologies: including anthropology, cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, computer science, linguistics, and art practices. Others use these terms interchangeably. This paper will follow the latter convention, except where a distinction is needed. philosophy. However, the discipline is sometimes understood more narrowly. According to the 1978 Sloan Report on Cognitive Science, the subdisciplines of cognitive science share "a common research objective: to discover the representational and computational capacities of the mind and their structural and functional representation in the brain" (1978: 76) .
2 This is a narrow construal of cognitive science; it is thus not merely a discipline but a doctrine, committed to the claim that the mind is a type of computer (Harnish 2002: 4) . This doctrine is broadly known as the computational theory of mind.
According to Ned Block, cognitive science would not be a cohesive field of research if not for this commitment (Block 1983: 521) . 3 Today, the broad construal has common usage on its side. The narrow construal has history on its side. For purposes of this discussion, a choice between these two construals is not necessary. And for that matter, such a choice may be arbitrary: it just may be the case, at least if current research practices provide relevant data, that cognitive science is not a precisely circumscribed domain. Thus for analysis of the relation/s between aesthetics and cognitive science, only a few minimal assumptions are made.
Actual practice dictates this much: cognitive science involves empirically grounded research on cognition. It is a science by virtue of some but not all of its methods (e.g. cognitive science includes both cognitive neuroscientific methods and philosophical methods). Conceptually, things are more murky. Cognitive science as such tends to study features of cognition-beliefs, knowledge, learning, attention, etc.-2 The Sloan Report is an unpublished report, commissioned by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation in 1978, on the then state of the art of cognitive science (see Miller 2003; Harnish 2002: 4-8 explained and modelled in computational terms. The weaker assumption can be made without committing to the identification of mind and computer.
Convention makes exceptions of both senses of the default research assumption:
one can find working cognitive scientists who do not commit to a computational theory of mind and those who use methods other than computational modelling techniques.
Perhaps the way forward, at least for this discussion, is to follow recent convention but with an eye towards a conceptual understanding of cognitive science. Cognitive scientific research is just what researchers in cognitive science departments are studying.
Such research tends to favor representation and computation as either the explananda or as explanans. So a cognitive scientist might, as such, assume that the target for her explanation is mental representation and computation; or she might only assume that representational and computational models are useful ways to explain cognition. But as is discussed below, the centrality of computation and representation to cognitive science is being challenged, and indeed by researchers working from within cognitive science. Much important research at the intersection of cognitive science and art is left out of the present analysis. For work on imagination see, among others, Currie 1998 Currie , 2004 Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; Nichols 2004 Nichols , 2006 Nichols and Stich 2000, 2003; Walton 1990 . On emotion, see Goldie 2000 Goldie , 2002 Goldie , 2005 Meskin and Weinberg 2003; Prinz 2004; Robinson 2005 . On evolution, art, and culture see Currie 2004; De Sousa 2004; Mithen 1996 Mithen , 2005 Tomasello 1999 . On creativity, see Boden 2004 Carruthers 2002 Gaut and Livingston 2003; Sawyer 2006; Simonton 1999; Stokes 2007. while the philosopher of art may concern herself with the influence of categories of art on aesthetic experience, or with appreciative and critical differences across art media or genre, among many other things, she rarely narrows her focus to the degree that Currie intimates. Rather, such a narrowed subject matter is in the hands of critical theorists and art historians. So cognitive science and aesthetics may be on a par with respect to generality of analysanda. Things like paintings and sentences possess derived intentionality; and they derive that intentionality from mental states, only the latter of which possess original intentionality (Haugeland 1981; Searle 1983; Fodor 1987) . Put another way, representational systems involving pictures or words are at least partly conventional, while organisms with minds involve representational systems that are purely natural (Dretske 1981 (Dretske , 1988 (Dretske , 1995 .
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Granting this distinction, the important connection between representation in mind and representation in art, intimated by Danto's comment, is simply that an explanation of the first is fundamental to an explanation of the second. This would imply a fundamental connection between aesthetics and cognitive science: a complete account of derived intentionality depends upon an account of original intentionality. The distinction between derived intentionality and original intentionality is not, however, without its critics (Dennett 1987) . At the very least, consideration of the purported distinction 5 Dretske's account appeals to a distinction made by philosopher and linguist Paul Grice (Grice 1957 In an introduction to a special issue of Philosophical Psychology devoted to cognitive science and aesthetics, Mark Rollins identifies this same connection (Rollins 1999a) . A concern common to many of the papers included in that issue, Rollins suggests, is "the nature of mental representation in the understanding and perception of art, and the need to include it in explanations of aesthetic experience" (Rollins 1999a: 382) . Erik Myin suggests that the concept of representation is one of two (the other being "pathways or modules") that "ground the hope for a deep connection between the representational science of vision and the art of visually representing" (Myin 2000: 43) . Rollins notes that these practices supervene on cognitive states and processes (Danto 7 See Carroll 1992; Currie 1993; Levinson 1992; Nathan 1992; Stecker 1997 Stecker , 2003 Stecker . 1993 Fodor 1993 (Rollins 2004: 186) . The perceptual strategies one employs in interpreting a picture are constrained by the strategies that are manifested in the work.
Artworks are thus cognitively and perceptually special: they betray the minimal communicative intentions needed for their proper appreciation.
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Contrary to the perception-based approaches taken by Lopes, Rollins, and the majority of philosophers on the subject, John Kulvicki addresses questions about pictorial representation by considering the representational systems in which pictures function.
Extending the work of Nelson Goodman, Kulvicki identifies four structural conditions for a pictorial representational system: relative repleteness, relative syntactic density, semantic richness and transparency. Any system which satisfies these conditions is 8 Minimal communicative intentions operate like Gricean constraints on communication in the sense that the audience for a work of art must assume that the artist intended her work for a certain type(s) of interpretation (see Schier 1986 ). In Levinson's terms, recognizing an artist's categorial intention-that a work is to be interpreted as a member of some artistic category C-is necessary to but not sufficient for determining the meaning of a work (see Levinson 1996: 188-9 among others. These analyses imply both that philosophical aesthetics should be aware of the relevant cognitive and neurological facts that underpin unique artistic schemes, and that cognitive science is obligated to explain this special category of perceptual object.
One may remain sceptical of the uniqueness thesis. Depending upon the level of description, one might maintain that the purportedly unique representational and semantic features of artworks can be accommodated by the standard explanations of cognitive 10 Much of audio recording satisfies these conditions, which Kulvicki understands as picturing audible properties.
science. Perhaps this is so. At the very least this thesis of expansionism motivates a progressive research strategy, whereby cognitive science may accrue theoretical benefit through the explanation of artistic phenomena.
The common capacity thesis
The common capacity thesis of expansionism is less controversial but not trivial.
Some cognitive and perceptual capacities are crucially important to our experiences of art. Mental representation is one obvious general candidate. As just discussed, general perceptual capacities are clearly central as well. Philosophical aesthetics does well to incorporate the relevant cognitive scientific research. Another important issue in aesthetics, implied by some of the above discussion-call it the question of the innocent eye-invokes research on perception and its relation to cognition.
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The art critic John Ruskin, and many of his contemporaries of the mid and late 19 th century, argued that the artist's aim and the audience's goal in proper appreciation of art is an innocent eye, a "return to the unadulterated truth of natural optics." 12 In more familiar contemporary terms, an innocent eye thesis suggests that our experiences of (visual) art either are or should be uninfluenced by cognitive elements like beliefs, knowledge, and concepts. Ernst Gombrich was the first to forcefully reject the innocent 11 Perceptual imagery is yet another candidate common capacity. See Currie's 'Aesthetics and Cognitive Science', which pays considerable attention to imagery (Currie 2003 ). Currie's work at the intersection of aesthetics and philosophy of mind has consistently argued for the importance of a cognitive science of imagery to philosophical aesthetics (see also Currie 1995; Curie and Ravenscroft 2002: 71-107 .) 12 Gombrich attributes this general category of view to a number of 19 th century artists and thinkers. In particular, the impressionists championed the view that they painted the world "as we really see it". Ruskin was responsible for coining the 'innocent eye' (Ruskin 1843 ; see also Gombrich 1961: 11-12) . eye as a myth (Gombrich 1961 ). Gombrich's rejection was informed by the New Look psychology of his day, which analyzed perceptual experience as being influenced by higher cognitive states and processes, namely, knowledge and concepts.
13 According to
Gombrich, perceptual experiences of pictures depend importantly upon the conceptual repertoire of the perceiver. Dispelling the innocent eye as myth was a motivation common to Gombrich's constructivism and Goodman's conventionalism. According to Goodman's view, all artworks are or are composed of symbols, and these symbols are to be understood in terms of their reference and the symbol system of which they are a part.
For Goodman, then, artworks are conventional and their experience highly cognitive (Goodman 1976 14 In a symposium entitled 'The Historicity of the Eye', Arthur Danto provides the target article, with criticism by Noel Carroll, Mark Rollins, and Whitney Davis (Danto 2001; Carroll 2001; Rollins 2001; Davis 2001) . The historicity of the eye is, for some of the analyses in this symposium, just the contrary of the innocent eye. However, the analysandum is not consistent across Danto's foils, Danto's analysis, and his critics' analyses. Indeed, at least three claims may be distinguished. The eye may be historical in the sense that: (a) vision is evolutionarily plastic and the history of art has shaped that evolution; (b) vision is developmentally plastic and exposure to and engagement with an art culture shapes that development; (c) vision is cognitively penetrable, where artrelevant cognitive states and capacities influence visual experience. As Danto interprets and criticizes him, the primary proponent of the historicity of the eye, Marx Wartofsky, intends a claim like (a) (Wartofsky 1980 (Wartofsky , 1984 . However, Carroll argues that in spite of Danto's criticisms, Wartofsky may have meant something weaker than (a), and Rollins suggests that in criticizing Wartofsky's claim as (a), Danto unnecessarily imports issues about modularity and cognitive penetrability more relevant to claim (c). In any case, the innocent eye opposes the historical eye only if the latter is understood as claim (c). 15 The issue of (non)conceptual content is also relevant, it should be noted, for theories of subpersonal mental representation (e.g. and utilities" (Pylyshyn 1999: 341) . The cognitive impenetrability thesis may be motivated by a modular theory of mind, which advances a mental architecture characterized by functionally discrete, informationally encapsulated structures (Fodor 1983; Sperber 2002.) Or it may be motivated by neuroscientific research on perceptual systems (Raftopoulos 2001) . Cognitive impenetrability is not without its dissenters. Paul Churchland has been a persistent critic of both modularity and cognitive impenetrability (Churchland 1979; . And novel arguments for theory-laden perception have been offered (Brewer and Lambert 2001; Estany 2001; McCauly and Henrich 2006) . The importance of this debate to cognitive science should be clear: models of perceptual representation must be constrained by the facts about cognitive penetrability.
Either conceptual influence or doxastic influence would vindicate Gombrich's claim that the innocent eye is a myth. And the ways and degrees to which perceptual experience is cognitively influenced, if it is in fact so influenced, is important for theories of the experience of art. So while the innocent eye strictly understood may today be something of a strawman, questions about interesting cognitive influences on perceptual experience, and thus experience of art, remain open. This common capacity-perceptual experience and the degree to which it is cognitively influenced-has been recognized in recent work at the intersection of aesthetics and cognitive science.
Daniel Gilman argues that the eye may be more innocent than many theorists of pictorial representation assume, at least if the relevant influence is doxastic.
Neuroscientific and computational studies on vision suggest that vision is not influenced by the cultural and historical beliefs and knowledge that conventionalism requires. The explanatory success of the double content view depends upon the general account of perception and content from which it derives. Dilworth is right to appeal to the increasing popularity of nonconceptual content views. However, the proposed nonconceptual/conceptual division of labour, as it were, remains contentious. Some theorists have argued instead that perceptual processing involves active categorization all the way down, resisting any distinction between sensation and perception or raw sensory information and the later conceptualization thereof (see Matthen 2005) . In any case, the double content view provides a clear example of the common capacity thesis: it supposes that the facts about experience of pictures are best explained by the facts about the underlying capacity, namely, perceptual processing. Despite their differences, this is true of the views of Hopkins and Lopes as well. In fact, all three philosophers maintain that perceptual experience of pictures depends (at least partly) upon the operation of ordinary perceptual capacities. The relevant disagreement concerns the degree and ways in which this operation is conceptually influenced. Endorsement of expansionism implies that adjudication will, partly, come from cognitive science.
Although vision and the pictorial still dominate the respective literature on perception and perception of art, similar issues arise for and have been analyzed in the philosophy and cognitive science of music. In her important work on the metaphysics and perception of music, Diana Raffman explains the apparent ineffability of musical experience by appeal to a modularized theory of perception. One of her theses is that language fails to describe the nuances of music and its experience-nuances are fine grained, performative details not dictated by a score, and often just noticeable-because, more fundamentally, such nuances are categorized by mental schema that are more coarsely grained. Experience of musical nuance is thus ineffable because nonconceptual (Raffman 1993 ). Raffman's analysis draws importantly on Fodor's modular theory of mind and Evans' fine-grainedness argument for nonconceptual content (Fodor 1983; Evans 1982) . 19 More recently, Michael Luntley has argued for nonconceptual content in perception of music (explicitly) not by appeal to fine-grainedness arguments but instead by appeal to the relation between experience and rationality. According to Luntley, one may experience a dominant 7 th chord, for example, insofar as one discriminates the auditory event. If one is a novice-lacking both music-theoretic knowledge and performance competency-one may represent this event without the representation being subject to inference. Nonconceptual contents as experienced in music by novices are nonconceptual because they do not "figure in rational organization of behaviour" (Luntley 2003: 417) . Luntley suggests that this metric for conceptual content generalizes, and if so it provides the nonconceptualist with a strategy that is sensitive to the Sellarsian challenge to perceptual knowledge. Much recent work in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has emphasized the role of the body and action in perception and cognition. This is not exactly new. The philosopher Hubert Dreyfus has been arguing for the importance of embodiment for better than three decades. According to Dreyfus, bodily experience of the everyday world enables gestalt pattern recognition and "coping" capacities. Holistic "lived experience" is thus a necessary condition for human understanding and higher order cognition (Dreyfus 1972 (Dreyfus , 1992 Dreyfus' work owes much to a number of earlier thinkers, most especially continental phenomenology : Heidegger 1927; Husserl 1912; Merleau-Ponty 1942 , 1945 . J.J. Gibson's ecological approach understands perception as geared to affordances of the environment-objects or features of the environment that are apt for use and action, in ways relative to different organisms (Gibson 1979) . Similarly, Dynamic Systems Theory emphasizes the interactivity between complex systems and their environments over time (Beer 1995; Thelen and Smith 1994; van Gelder 1995; Varela et al. 1991 ).
Mark
These views have often been launched as criticisms of the representationalism and rule-bound computation of classical cognitive science-sometimes from the inside, sometimes from the outside-motivating increased scepticism about the explanatory purchase of cognitive science as such. And indeed many researchers working in related disciplines like evolutionary robotics embrace these negative implications for cognitive science. However, the research strategies fundamental to this scepticism are also appropriated to supplement rather than supplant more traditional, representation-based cognitive science. In this spirit, many philosophers and cognitive scientists dismiss not mental representations, but instead the traditional assumption that mental representations are tokened and computed in a way decoupled from the body and action. For example, Andy Clark argues for a view that accommodates the sceptic's insights regarding the explanatory importance of dynamics of body and environment, while maintaining that there is space for both being there and representation in cognitive science (Clark 1997: 143-75) . The unifying thread is this: both sceptics and combined theorists take the study of embodiment to be important not just for the explanation of action but also for the explanation of cognition. The disagreement concerns whether embodiment is sufficient for cognitive explanation.
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With this alternative development in cognitive science comes alternative approaches to aesthetic issues. If at least the common capacity thesis of expansionism is true, then some old questions in aesthetics may be seen in new light. Rollins argues for a new category of perceptual approach to pictorial representation that he calls strategic design theory (SDT) (Rollins 1999b (Rollins , 2003 (Rollins , 2004 . SDTs divide into internalist and externalist theories. An internalist SDT suggests that solutions to perceptual problems like contour completion are achieved not by exhaustive representations of the environmental stimuli, but by exploiting diagnostic features of the stimuli-features of the environment likely to be informative. This enables more efficient use of attention and ultimately more efficient computation of input. 22 An externalist SDT emphasizes the relation between perception and action. Perceptual processing is task-dependent: internal representations are constructed and employed by the system only as needed for the 21 For other "combined" theorists, see Ballard 1991 , Hooker et al. 1992 . See also the theorists discussed below in relation to Milner and Goodale's research on distinct information-processing streams in the brain. 22 Rollins categorizes Churchland and Sejnowski 1992 , Kosslyn 1994 , Ramachandran 1990 , and Zeki 1999 as internalist theories.
development and execution of motor plans. Some of the computational load is thus born by the environment. 23 Common to the internalist and externalist strategies is a deemphasis on internal representations and an emphasis on environment and/or action.
Rollins claims that either type of SDT offers a (partial) account of the comprehension and interpretation of artworks. Whether internal or external, both artist and audience employ perceptual strategies in the experience of a work. Artists guide audiences by creating a
work that constrains what perceptual strategies enable understanding of that work. The philosophical advantage of such a naturalistic account is that it affords an explanatory role for artistic intention in the experience of art without, on the side of the audience, overintellectualizing the process of meaning attribution and, on the side of the artist, without overintellectualizing intention or giving it an exhaustive role in the determination of meaning (Rollins 2004: 185-6 ).
In a related spirit, a number of recent theories of perception might be broadly categorized as active. In slogan form, active theories of perception say that perceiving doesn't happen to us, it is something we do (Noë 2004). Perceptual experience is not just the result of internal representations formed in response to external stimuli, but also of the fact that we plan and execute action in the world, and in ways dependent upon the physiological details of our body and brain (O'Regan and Noë 2001; Hurley 1998 Hurley , 2001 ).
This general research strategy is informed by much of the same research as Rollins' Some recent theorists of perception distinguish the capacity of visual perception to provide descriptive information about stimuli from its capacity to guide action (Campbell 2002; Clark 2001 Clark , 2007 Matthen 2005) . These theories are influenced by the work of cognitive neuroscientists David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, who distinguish two information-processing streams in the brain (Milner and Goodale 1995 experiential difference between seeing a depiction and seeing a thing depicted-the depictum-through the depiction: seeing the depictum lacks a feeling of presence, since features of the two-dimensional depictum are processed only by dv. This generalizes to differences between experiences of two-dimensional versus three-dimensional art media.
Sculpture, theatre, and performance, by contrast with painting, photography, and film, will engage both dv and mgv, resulting in agent-centred experiences of the former but not the latter. This experiential difference might be fruitfully explored in comparative analyses of the aesthetic and affective features of two versus three-dimensional art media.
Conclusion: A possible experimental turn
Aesthetic theories may take an increasingly more experimental turn. Mike
Wheeler, among others, has suggested that the techniques of artificial life and evolutionary robotics may experimentally support theories of aesthetic, and closely related, phenomena (Wheeler 1996 ). An example of such an approach has been taken to creativity-a phenomenon by no means exclusive, but certainly relevant, to philosophical aesthetics. Rather than beginning with high-level genius or masterworks, one might take a bottom-up approach to the phenomenon by using evolutionary robotics (ER). ER is a biologically inspired research methodology where artificial agents are assessed for fitness by a genetic algorithm, according to fitness functions specified for some kind of task completion. Fit agents are selected for reproduction and, after many generations, agents evolve to perform the desired task/s (Husbands et al. 1997; Nolfi and Floreana 2000) .
Jon Bird and Dustin Stokes suggest some minimal conditions for creative behaviour and then attempt to artificially evolve agents that meet those conditions Stokes 2006, 2007) . Notions of agency, autonomy, and novelty are analyzed both through the lens of conceptual analysis and the lens of robotics experimentation. This approach yields empirically supported answers to traditional questions regarding creativity. For example, Kantian and romantic theories of creativity specify a negative condition on creative thought such that a person (or system) may act creatively only if that person is free from constraints. Bird and Stokes show that this supposition is false: systems subject to considerable behavioural constraints may still act in ways that are, at least minimally, creative (Stokes and Bird 2008 ).
Some argue not just for experimentation in aesthetics, but that art and its experience are experimental (Livingstone 2002; Zeki 1999 interdependent relations between movement and sensory stimulation. 25 Some artworks thus provide opportunity for perceivers to "catch themselves in the act" of exploration of the environment. One worry is that the purported feature of so-called experimential art generalizes not just to all art objects, but to any object of experience. Noë's response is to claim that certain types of artwork-Noë chooses the large-scale installations of Richard Serra as an example-are "intrinsically site-specific" particulars that overwhelm the senses in a way especially suited to self-reflection upon experience. Whether or not Noë's defense is satisfying, his insight is an important one. Experiences of art, most especially when explained by active theories of perception, may offer an alternative experimental test bed for claims about consciousness, experience, and phenomenology.
Artistic experience as experiment is expansionism at its most extreme: it says that the exercise of common capacities in experiences of art is sufficiently unique to provide experimental insight into both artistic and non-artistic exercise of those capacities. This instance of expansionism, and all others considered above, is founded on two basic observations. One, there are contingent environmental, physiological, and psychological facts about cognition and experience. Two, there is something cognitively and 
